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Property Rights, Grazing Permits,
and Rancher Welfare
David K. Lambert and J. S. Shonkwiler
This  study attempts  to link factors  affecting  the demand for Bureau  of Land  Management
grazing  to perceived  changes in permittee welfare over the 1962-92  period. Annual demand
for federal  forage  is found to be sensitive  to active preference, beef cow and breeding ewe
inventories, and grazing fees and nonfee allotment  utilization costs. No evidence is found to
support the notion that the demand for grazing has been affected by changes in property rights
associated with the federal grazing permit that are not reflected  in higher user costs. The total
decrease  in welfare  generated from  the permit to graze public lands  has been  about 9% per
authorized cattle animal unit month and 65% per authorized sheep animal unit month over the
study period.
Key words: confirmatory factor analysis, grazing fees, latent variables, property rights, public
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Introduction
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the Department of the Interior manages  over
150 million acres of rangeland  in the western United States. These lands have traditionally
been managed for commercial uses, such as livestock grazing, timber harvest, and mining.
Noncommercial  use of public land resources has always been present (Clawson and Held),
but high costs of access and remoteness from population centers prevented serious conflicts
among users until recently.
Within  the  last  thirty  years,  increasing  demand  for  nonconsumptive  use  of natural
resources  has  resulted  in  increasing  conflicts  among  claimants  to the  public lands.  The
objective  of this article  is to analyze the conflict, especially  as changes in resource values
have altered the sets of property rights agricultural users of the public lands enjoy. Ranching
interests  maintain that  the transaction  costs  associated with utilizing  BLM permits  have
greatly increased  due to expanded permittee responsibility for maintaining the natural and
man-made  attributes of an allotment, as well as the livestock industry's declining influence
in resource use decisions.  Although some evidence  exists that rents accruing to holders of
the  permits  have  decreased  over time  (Torell  and  Doll),  there  has  been  little  empirical
analysis to identify the factors affecting aggregate demand for public land grazing (excep-
tions include  Johnson and Watts; Narayanan et al.). This study investigates changes in the
market for BLM forage resulting from changes both internal and external to the system. The
conceptual  foundation  for the demand  analysis  rests upon  the newly  evolving  school of
economic property rights analysis (Barzel). Any changes in demand unaccounted for by fee
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and  nonfee  grazing  costs  and  livestock industry  trends will be  interpreted  to arise  from
changes in the set of property rights held by permittees.
The Nature of Property Rights in Natural Resources
The assignment  of property  rights  is  integral  to  the  operation  of an  economic  system.
Property rights allocate actors' abilities to consume, to derive income from, and/or to alienate
certain  attributes of an asset (Barzel).  It is important  to note  the distinction between  the
economic  and  the  legal  definitions  of property  rights.  Legal  rights  generally  enhance
economic rights, but are neither sufficient nor necessary for economic rights to exist (Barzel).
One role of legal  rights  is to  reduce  the transaction  costs  associated  with protecting  an
economic property right.  As Coase points out, what are exchanged  in market transactions
are not physical entities but the rights to perform certain actions. Holders of a federal grazing
permit,  thus,  have purchased the right to graze a  certain number of animals  for a certain
period of time. Certain use restrictions  may apply. Uses that are not stipulated may be left
to the discretion of the permittee. As social values change, the set of property rights available
to the permittee may  be reduced  when the  opportunity  costs of grazing  increase.  Conse-
quently, the set of property rights enjoyed by permittees may change over time.
Several authors have provided historical analyses of the evolution of property rights  in
the lands of the American  West (e.g.,  Voight;  Libecap).  Constraints  included  in the laws
governing land disposal prevented the establishment of legal rights in the large tracts of  land
necessary for commercial livestock production in the region. Ownership and, consequently,
legal control were centered on sources of water or productive meadowlands.  The problem
facing  ranchers  was  to  develop  methods  to  establish control  over  the remainder of the
unowned, or open, range deemed necessary for their operations,  yet beyond  the ranchers'
purview to own in fee simple.
Open range meant open access, so that overgrazing was often practiced to dissipate any
benefits competing range users might attain (Libecap).  As the West became more populated,
competition  from  other  settlers,  both  graziers  and  farmers,  resulted  in  the  creation  of
exclusive  livestock associations  and fencing,  in many  cases  illegal,  to prevent  access  to
unclaimed public lands  (Libecap).  Finally, with the passage  of the Taylor Grazing  Act in
1934  (PL 73-482),  grazing districts were established under the joint administration  of the
Grazing Service and the General  Land Office. Legislative  intent with respect to the Taylor
Grazing Act included the establishment of property rights in the use of  the public range, thus
reducing the transaction  costs incurred by ranchers in protecting their access to the public
domain. The issuance of permits established a vehicle by which wealth could reasonably be
expected to arise from more secure  access to the public range.
The original act identified  142 million acres for inclusion in grazing districts.  Six regional
offices provided administrative and enforcement duties but also were mandated to "interpret
the desires and needs of the local stockmen" (Buckman). The "desires and needs of the local
stockmen"  were  expressed  through  district advisory  boards  composed of local  stockmen
having historical access to the public range. Little concern was expressed for other users of
the  range,  excepting  that  the  carrying  capacity  of the  range  should  not  be  exceeded
(Buckman). If the role of property rights is to define actors' roles in decisions affecting scarce
resources (Furubotn and Pejovich),  the livestock industry clearly enjoyed vast rights in the
management  of the range in the early days of grazing district management.
For the year 1936,  15,067 permits were  issued allowing 7,434,416 head of livestock  to
use the lands of the grazing  districts  (Buckman).  Livestock  numbers  remained  relatively
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unchanged through the beginning of the 1960s. Although incitements against cattle grazing
appeared  in special  interest group press (e.g., Stegner),  it was in the  1960s'  that effective
environmental legislation began to appear that would constrain permittees' property rights
in the public range.
Beginning in 1959, the Bureau of Land Management itself began presenting findings of
range  deterioration  resulting  from  overstocking  (USDI/BLM  1959).  Successive  reports
called for further grazing controls to be established to promote scientific management of the
public rangelands.  In a  1975 study, significant deterioration of public range in Nevada was
accredited to the wide management discretion granted to permittees (USDI/BLM  1975).
Means  for the  attenuation  of permittee  property  rights  were  provided  by a  wave  of
legislation. Among the acts affecting decision making on the public lands was the Classifi-
cation and Multiple Use Act of 1964 (PL 88-607). This act expanded the set of legitimate
claimants to the resources associated with the public lands. No longer was the goal of land
management to be the promotion of the maximum livestock production attainable from the
land. Instead, land managers were mandated to consider the relative values derived from all
resources.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (PL 91-190) required all federal
agencies to consider the impacts of policy decisions  on environmental  quality. The NEPA
was an important basis for Natural  Resources Defense Council  (NRDC) v. Morton (388 Fed.
Supp. 829), in which it was determined that grazing constituted  a significant alteration of
the environment.  Consequently,  local BLM grazing plans were required to be analyzed by
environmental  impact statements  (EIS).  These EISs  were  required to include  alternative
management plans that did not emphasize livestock grazing as a major use of the land.
The NRDC v. Morton case eventually  gave rise to the bureau's  first  organic  act,  the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-579).  This act ended the policy
of disposal of the public  lands and established goals of long-run management of the lands
for sustained yield and multiple use. The act also ended the domination of grazing advisory
boards by local livestock interests.  The act mandated the establishment of advisory boards
having representation from a variety of groups interested in the management of the lands.
A final  piece of legislation  affecting management  of the public  lands was the Public
Rangeland Improvement Act (PRIA) of 1978 (PL 95-514). PRIA codified range management
practices through the requirement of allotment management plans (AMPs) being developed
for all grazing  areas.  The AMPs resulted from consultation among ranchers, bureau staff,
and other interested parties in determining grazing practices within an allotment. Additional
powers were granted to the secretary of the interior to reduce livestock stocking levels and
shorten the term of grazing permits if required to comply with range improvement  guide-
lines.
At the time of this writing, additional proposals are being debated that will further limit
permittees'  influence  in the decision-making  process by expanding the range of interests
represented on citizens'  advisory boards (USDI/BLM  1994).  Additional  proposals would
affect both grazing fees and other transaction costs incurred by ranchers wishing to graze
stock on the public lands, as well as reduce the security of tenure associated with a grazing
permit (Davis).
In spite of the increasingly stipulated requirements placed on the permittee  in using the
grazing allotment, there has been little change in the number of cattle permitted to graze or
-Comparable  measures for 1960 calendar year were  19,371  permits issued to 18,337 operators,  who were allowed to graze
7,216,490 animals (USDI/BLM  1961).
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Figure 1.  Active preference and authorized  use on BLM section 3 lands, sheep.
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Figure 2.  Active preference and authorized  use on BLM section 3 lands, cattle
Note: Active  preference values for 1985-92 are combined cattle and sheep preference.
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in the grazing fee. Sheep numbers have fallen dramatically on the public range. The number
of authorized animal unit months (AUMs) of grazing available to sheep producers fell about
65%  between  1962  and  1992  (fig.  1).  However,  there  has only been a  10%  reduction  in
authorized cattle AUMs on section 3 lands (fig. 2). Fees paid by ranchers have not increased
relative to other production costs.  Figure 3 indicates some  increase in the real grazing fee
up to  1980.  However, the institution  of the PRIA formula  in  1980 for calculating  grazing
fees has provided ranchers with a fairly stable grazing fee. It thus appears that we must look
at other factors affecting the market for federal forage to determine the source of  any changes
in permittee welfare.
The Market for Public Forage
The attractiveness of a grazing permit depends upon the property rights associated with the
permit and on exogenous factors affecting the derived demand  for forage. The demand for
forage derives from the expected net revenues generated from the sale of animals consuming
the forage.  Demand can be met from  several  sources, including  public  rangelands,  lands
leased from private sources,  and from the ranchers'  privately  owned lands.  The marginal
value of a unit of rangeland  may differ among  the  various  sources  depending upon  the
seasonal  availability  of alternative  forage  and feed  supplies, the nutritional quality of the
forage, energy expended by the grazing animal in consuming the forage, and the provision
of feed  supplements  to  enhance  the  efficacy  of forage  metabolism.  The  property  rights
enjoyed by the rancher with respect to harvesting the forage may differ among the alternative
sources of forage.
Administrative  decree places upper bounds on forage supplies  from public rangelands.
This quantity, termed active preference, is available to the qualifying rancher if he agrees to
pay the  current  grazing  fee  and  to  incur the nonfee  costs  and  management  restrictions
required for the utilization of the public land. However, as Johnson and Watts note, differing
amounts of nonuse are voluntarily taken by ranchers  from year to year. The proportion of
active preference  actually paid for each year, termed authorized use,  averages about 85%.
Although constrained by agency limits, especially in the long run, actual animal unit months
consumed appear to be affected by factors other than active preference.
Figure 4 illustrates the market for federal forage for a typical year. Active preference,  or
the upper limit available,  is  Qmax.  It is well established that total grazing  costs exceed  the
federal grazing fee (Torell et al.). Quantity actually used by the permittees is Q0, determined
by the intersection of the demand curve and the total  fee and nonfee costs associated with
using the public range.
Changes in the derived demand for forage may influence nonuse requested by ranchers.
In figure  5,  demand for forage has shifted to the left, perhaps due to depressed beef cattle
prices or falling prices for substitute forage. This inward shift increases nonuse of  the federal
forage,  from  Q0 to Q1 . Welfare  changes resulting  from the  shift equal area a.  Declining
demand,  ceteris  paribus,  will  reduce  surplus  associated with  the  permit.  The  change  in
average permit value will depend on whether b/Q1 is greater or less than (a + b)/Qo.
Changes in either the grazing fee or in transaction costs associated with using the permit
will also affect permittee surplus. An increase in fee and/or nonfee costs will shift the cost
of using the range upwards (fig.  6). Fewer animal unit months will be harvested, and total
rancher  surplus will fall by area b + c.  Finally, reductions  in active preference may affect










Figure 4. Demand (D) and supply (S) in the market for federal forage
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Figure 6. Changing use costs and the market for federal grazing
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Figure 7.  Change  in active  preference and the market for federal grazing
actual use. If, for example, Qmax  is reduced  Qma,  the upper bound becomes binding. In this
example (fig. 7), producer surplus will decrease by area b + c.
Measurement of the Derived Demand for Federal Grazing
Supply  in time St is constrained  by the upper bound decreed by the BLM  (Smax). Demand
(D) for forage is influenced by both fee and nonfee allotment costs, Fee and Nonfee, and a
set of demand shifters, Xt, such as the size of the beef cow herd or flock of breeding ewes
and prices of substitutes. The "market"  for forage  can be expressed as folllows:
St = Stax
D = D, (Feet, Nonfee,, X),
)D,S  ,  or Dt < St,  or
Dt = St - Nonuset.
The inclusion ofNonuset allows writing of  the market clearing condition in (1) and derivation
of a reduced-form representation of the BLM forage market.  Factors affecting Nonuset are
2Technically, permittees may request nonuse  for a maximum of three years before BLM administrators adjust the ranchers'
active  preference  to reflect  the lower demands  for forage made by  the rancher.  However,  persistent nonuse of about 15%  of
active preference and apparent laxity by the BLM in enforcing the legal requirement (Johnson and Watts) allows treating nonuse
as a choice variable more or less freely available to the rancher.
Lambert, ShonkwilerJournal  of Agricultural and  Resource Economics
the same, though opposite in sign, to factors affecting use. As grazing fees go up, for example,
one  would  expect  use  to  decline  and,  ergo,  Nonuse, to  go  up.  The  resulting  model  for
authorized use can be expressed as:
(2)  Dt =  3Sax - (y (Feet + Nonfee)  + 6'X)+  1,,
where  A  y and  6 are parameters to be estimated.  The error terms,  rt,,  are assumed to be
normally distributedwith mean zero.
The problem with standard estimation procedures applied to equation (2)  is that Nonfee
is unknown. However,  scattered evidence has been collected to estimate BLM grazing costs
at selected  points  in  time.  Although  not perfect,  these observations  might provide some
indication  of the unobservable  latent variable, Nonfeet. Other sets of information,  such as
price series for selected production  items, might also be imperfect indicators of Nonfeet.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Bollen) can be used to specify a relationship among
a set of indicators  and the unobserved  latent variable  i,. We can infer the influence  of the
different observed indicators on ~. Following Ford and Shonkwiler, CFA can represent these
relationships:
m2t  |2  |2t
(3)  t+  .
mkt  _  k _  kt
The k variables, m,,, . . , m,, serve as indicators  of the latent variable  it. The elements of
X= (XI,...,  .) are the factor loadings, or the factor proportionalities  between the different
indicators and the unobserved  variable Nonfeet. None of the indicators  are perfect but are
rather observed as influencing i, with errors  £,,  . k..,  e.  The closeness of the relation-
ship between any indicator mi, and  i, is proportional to  Xi  and the variance of et.
This relationship is seen by forming the second moment of (3):
(4)  cov(m)=  X'  + V =  MM  (0),
where q  is the variance of i  and
V  = [  '  ..
Note  that  each  ,  is  an imperfect  indicator  as  long  as  . Also,  since  scaleof the
Note  that  each  mi, is  an imperfect  indicator  as  long  as  ai >  0.  Also,  since  scale  of the
relationships  is more  important  than  location,  the  indicators  are  usually centered  around
zero, and one of the ais is normalized to one (Ford and Shonkwiler).
Inclusion of the latent variable  it  in the demand  equation (2) results in
D,  = psmm _  -(y(Fee,  +t)  + 6  t)+nt.
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Letting  r  = [y,  P,  6,  y] and Z = [E SlaxXFee], where  i,  S
a x, X, and Fee are the vector or
matrix which  contains the observations for all time periods,  then (5)  can be written more
compactly  as:
(6)  D=  Z  +1,
where D = (DI,..., Dt).
The second moment of (6) is
(7)  var(D) = r'or  + T  =  )(e),
where  T is the variance  of rl  t and  D is the variance-covariance  matrix of both the latent
variable i  and the observed variables, Fee, Sax, andX. 3 Estimation of  the parameters, factor
loadings, and variances  is accomplished using the second moments  of (3)  and (6).  Let  W
represent all observed predetermined variables then the observed second moments are
(8)  V=  D
()VWD  VWW
and the structural  second moments are
(9)  Z()_ [  (0)  Z  w(eo)
and recognizing that
(10)  ZDW(o)=  (r',
results in the likelihood function used for estimation:
(11)  -0.5Nln[det(Z (0))]-  0.5Ntr((0  )-' V).
3Modifications  are necessary  to equation  (3) and to the  variance-covariance  matrix o.  Letting X represent  the observed
independent variables, (3)  becomes
W=  ] =  ... ]  [  .[  and  =
0  J~  LY  A
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Data
Data are available for the years  1962 through  1992 for ten western states having significant
BLM grazing district lands.  Annual data on grazing  permits, including  number of permits,
active preference,  and authorized use,  are published by the BLM  in Public  Land Statistics
(USDI/BLM).  Active preference  is the difference  between grazing preference,  or the total
amount of grazing  tied to  a  permit,  and  suspended  nonuse.  Suspended  nonuse  includes
grazing privileges removed from the permit more or less permanently, based on continuing
monitoring of  range carrying capacity. Active preference is the amount of grazing the rancher
could  theoretically  use  (Hines).  Authorized  use  is the  amount  of forage  for  which  the
permittee has actually paidover the bureau's fiscal year.
Active preference data are available for cattle and for sheep separately up to 1984.4From
1985  onwards,  active  preference  is only available  on an aggregated  basis  (Pack).  Conse-
quently,  separate coefficients  are estimated  for  SmaX  for the years  before  1985  and  for the
later years.  January first beef cow and breeding  ewe numbers were collected for each state
(USDA).  The aggregate  inventory series were constructed by weighting each state's inven-
tory  by the  proportion  of the  ten-state total  AUMs for that  state.  The price  of substitute
forages was represented  by the private land lease rate compiled each year by the National
Agricultural  Statistical Service.  The lease rate was deflated by the producer price index for
all commodities and-services, interest, taxes, and wage rates. BLM grazing fees were deflated
by the producer prices paid index.
Indicators  for the Nonfeet latent variable  included deflated price series for wages, to
reflect both paid and unpaid labor employed in allotment management, and a combined index
of auto and truck expenses and fuel costs. Estimates of the actual costs arising from operating
a BLM grazing allotment were derived from  studies reporting utilization costs for running
cattle  (sheep)  on public  lands  (table  1)-six  for cattle  and  two for sheep.  A smoothing
procedure was employed for extrapolating  these point estimates over the 31  years. The six
(2) observed values were deflated by the general producer price index, and these observations
were then regressed  on the input cost index (USDA/USDI  1986,  1993)  compiled to reflect
cow-calf  costs,  similarly  deflated.  The  rationale  for  this  procedure  was  to  reflect cost
differences  more likely to reflect production expenditure shares faced by western livestock
producers. The latent variable Nonfee twas estimated using this extrapolated series ofnonfee
utilization  costs, as  well  as  the observed  price  series  on  wages  and the fuel/vehicle  cost
index.
4Use  and preference  values for cattle  include horses. Unfortunately, separate cattle and horse values are not available for all
years. However,  for most of the years from  1973 onwards for which authorized  use is available  for both, horse use is less than
1% of the total.  Sheep and goat use is also combined  in the BLM  data.  However,  for 1959,  the last year in which the separate
livestock  classes are listed, goats represented  less than 0.5% of the authorized  use.
5The rationale behind this application  of confirmatory  factor analysis  is that nonfee  costs are a significant expense in using
a grazing allotment, but no annual series are collected to quantify this expense. A few isolated cost studies exist to provide  some
estimate  of the magnitude  of these  costs.  Intrayear  extrapolations  provide  a  rough estimate  of how these  costs might have
changed  in  the years for which  no cost studies were  conducted. This  smoothed  series, adjusted by a price  index reflective  of
the  composition  of the actual  tasks associated with managing  livestock  in an  allotment, provides  one of the three imperfect
indicators of the desired unobservable Nonfeei. This unobserved variable is measured with error, but that is explicit in the nature
of the analysis.
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Table  1.  Survey  Estimates of Nominal  Nonfee  Costs Associated  with
BLM Cattle and Sheep Allotments
Year  Survey Area  Cattle  Sheep
cost ($)  cost ($)
1966  Western  U.S.a  2.83  4.53
1982  Oregonb  10.13
1983  Idahob  15.46
1983  Nevadab 8.99
1990  Updated Western  U.S.C  12.48
1992  Idaho, New Mexico,  and Wyomingd  15.41  23.23
aReported in  USDA/USDI  1986.
bObermiller and Lambert  1984.
CNielson,  D. B.
dTorell et al.
Data Analysis and Results
Cattle
Confirmatory factor analysis parameter estimates from the maximization of the log-likeli-
hood function  (11)  for both cattle and sheep are presented in table 2. Results  of the cattle
CFA indicate that the  factor loadings  for wages  and on the transportation  cost index are
significant.  Estimates of the standard deviations of the measurement errors associated with
these  indicators,  as  well  as  the  cost  series  Nonfeet constructed  from  the  six  surveys
considered,  are  also  highly  significant.  The  results  suggest  that the  indicators  used  are
significant, though imperfect,  indicators of the utilization costs latent variable Nonfeet.
Given  factor  loadings  and  the  estimated  variances,  unbiased  estimates  of the  latent
variable series can be constructed (from Bartlett, as discussed in Lawley and Maxwell):
(12)  it=[  i-']  ^  t,
where Z is the diagonal variance-covariance  matrix of the errors from equation (3),  X  is the
vector of factor loadings,  and mtare the indicators. Both real and nominal estimates of the
costs Nonfeet are presented in figure 8.
Nominal estimates appear to track well the few survey results available for the period.
In real terms, the estimate  of the nonfee costs have risen approximately  12%  over the 31
years, or an annual increase of about 0.4% over the general index of producer prices.
Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for predicting cattle and sheep authorized use
are reported in table 3. The overall influence on cattle AUMs demanded of both grazing fees
and nonfee costs has been negative and mildly significant (t = -1.591).  Scaling of the data
prevents easy interpretation of the parameter estimates.  However,  the elasticity of demand
calculated at the means of the data (table 4) is - 0.249. This value is similar to the estimates
of Johnson and Watts (-  0.2)  and Narayanan et al.  (-  0.178), though input price in both of
these studies was limited to the observed grazing fee. Our results support the conclusions of
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Table 2.  Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Cattle and Sheep
Factor Loadings  Standard
Variables  A  Deviation
Cattle:
Wages  0.59748  6.60792
(0.13509)  (0.83729)
Buildings, fences,  0.20364  2.21009
autos and trucks  (0.04158)  (0.26669)
Nonfee cost studies  1  0.16470
(NA)  (0.06025)
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Figure 8.  Nominal and real (1991  dollars) unbiased estimates of the latent variable nonfee graz-
ing costs for cattle
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Table 3.  Maximum Likelihood  Parameter Estimates for Predicted Cattle and
Sheep AUMs
Estimated  Covariance
Variables  Coefficient  with g
Cattle:



















Fee and Nonfee Costs  - 0.97806  0.21242
(0.40634)  (0.03768)
(fees only)
AUMS1962-84  0.57389  -23.0315
(0.20528)  (1.01725)
AUMS  985-92  0.10132  76.3055
(0.02779)  (4.21212)
Sheep  0.13760  -29.1862
(0.09150)  (1.20505)
PLLR  - 0.96630  -3.00622
(0.39105)  (0.12857)
1/2 (standard deviation)  0.70474
(0.08341)
Note:  Standard errors are  in parentheses.
Table 4.  Elasticity Estimates Calculated  at the Means of the Data
Grazing  Fee
and Nonfee  Active Pref.  Active Pref.
Costs  PLLR  Inventory  1962-84  1985-92
Cattle  - 0.248  0.234  0.223  0.344  0.407
Sheep  -1.224  -0.663  0.426  0.817  1.037
these earlier studies: the demand for authorized use by cattle ranchers is inelastic, even when
nonfee costs are included in the price of the input. Small increases  in these costs will have
a negative effect on AUMs demanded, but public land grazing costs will increase as a share
of ranchers'  total costs due to the inelastic nature of the demand. Whether these increased
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expenditures  go  to  the  federal  treasury,  to  local  agricultural  input  suppliers,  or require
additional inputs of permittees' owned resources, including time, will depend upon whether
the source of the cost increases is from increased grazing fees or increased nonfee costs due
to higher transaction costs arising from changes in the set of property rights associated with
the grazing permits.
The other factors affecting  demand for BLM  forage by cattle ranchers  are all highly
significant and of the expected sign. The influence of active preference  (i.e., Sax) is similar
between the two periods representing changes in BLM's reporting procedures. A 1% change
in active preference results in a less than unitary percentage change in authorized use (0.34%
for 1962-84 and 0.41% for 1985-92). Two possible explanations might apply to the elasticity
estimates. One, reductions (there were very few years in which active preference increased)
might only affect those permits which were not being used anyway. For example, permits
for use in allotments that had not been used for many years might not be reissued at the time
of  a ranch sale. Consequently,  such a reduction in active preference would have no effect on
authorized use. In other cases, reductions  in active preference  might lead to the nonuse of
allotments having low marginal value product relative to utilization costs. Referring to figure
7,  restrictions  in  Smax  might  lead to the abandonment  of  (Q0 - Qe)  AUMs.  However,
changes in demand and in allotment utilization costs over the study period did not result in
Smax ever being a binding constraint.
The demand shifters,  state beef cow inventory and private  land lease rate,  both have
positive  and  significant  influences  on AUMs  of authorized  use,  as  expected  from  the
discussion of figure 5. As cattle inventories change  1%, authorized AUMs demanded change
0.224%.  Similar responses are noted for changes in the lease price of private land grazing.
These inelastic responses may be attributed to rigidities in the contractual  arrangements  of
the  grazing  permit.  Although  never binding in  the years  studied,  active preference  does
impose a limit on any increases  in forage demand  resulting  from increased inventories  or
increases in substitute forage costs. Factors resulting in an outward shift in the demand for
federal grazing may limit individual ranchers to limits imposed by their active preference.
Transaction  costs associated with initiating use of previously unused allotments  may mask
eventual increases in their use that would not be captured in this short-run model. Conversely,
leftward shifts in demand may see abandonment of higher priced nonfederal forage and feed
sources, with ranchers continuing use of what may be their lowest priced forage resource.
Sheep
Parameter estimates resulting  from the sheep log-likelihood  function are in tables 2 and 3.
Many of the results are analogous to those previously discussed with respect to cattle use of
BLM  section 3 lands. Estimated factor loadings for the first two indicator series are both
positive  and  significant.  Variance  estimates  in  the  CFA  are  all  highly  significant,  again
indicating that the series are imperfect  indicators of the latent variable sheep nonfee costs.
Real and nominal nonfee cost variable estimates  are seen in figure 9.  Real nonfee costs are
estimated to have increased 26%  over the period, or 0.9%  a year. These real cost increases
are over twice as large as those estimated for cattle nonfee costs.
The effects of changes  in fee and nonfee  costs are greater for sheep than for cattle. The
negative  parameter  estimate  is  significant  (t  = -2.407).  In  addition,  demand  is  elastic
(elasticity  = -1.224)  for changes in fee and nonfee costs.  Further increases  in the costs of
utilizing BLM grazing lands  would likely precipitate  a greater than proportional  decrease
in sheep use of the public lands.  These elasticity estimates may reflect the sensitivity of the
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Figure 9.  Nominal and real (1991  dollars) unbiased estimates of the latent variable Nonfee
grazing costs for sheep
U.S.  sheep  industry  to  any  additional  exogenous  factors  having  a  detrimental  effect  on
industry profits (Whipple and Menkhaus).
Sheep authorized  use is more sensitive to the other independent  variables considered.
Changes in active preference have a nearly unitary impact on authorized use (elasticities of
0.818 for the 1962-84 period and 1.038 for the 1985-92 period). One percent changes in the
breeding ewe inventory results in a 0.427% change in demand.
The sign and significance of the coefficient estimate on the private land lease rate (PLLR)
is surprising. The negative influence of  the PLLR on sheep authorized use might be explained
by the limited potential to substitute privately leased rangelands  for federal grazing  allot-
ments because of the land extensive  nature of western  sheep production.  Changes in the
PLLR might also affect sheep use indirectly. For example, increases in the private lease rate
may reflect  higher  opportunity  costs  of resources  devoted  to  sheep production.  Higher
opportunity  costs  may  in  turn  drive  additional  sheep  producers  out  of business,  thus
decreasing the demands sheep producers make on the public rangelands. Tests of alternative
hypotheses might be the subject of future research.
Welfare Analysis and Imputed Value of the Federal  Grazing  Permit
Earlier discussion  addressed  the welfare effects  of changes  in the market for public land
grazing permits. Total surplus can be measured by integrating under the demand curve and
6One  reviewer  suggested  that many sheep  allotments are converted  to cattle use. Consequently,  some of the  decreases  in
sheep active preference  may appear as increases  in cattle active preference.  The aggregate level of the data and the change in
bureau reporting procedures in  1985 preclude  testing the significance of this phenomenon.
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Figure 10.  Real (1991  dollars) estimates of the Marshallian surplus per AUM  arising from
cattle (lefthand scale)  and sheep (righthand scale)  BLM grazing permits
above the fee and nonfee costs estimated for each year. These surplus measures are illustrated
in figure 10 for cattle and sheep. There has been a gradual decline in the average surplus per
cattle AUM over the last 30 years of about  10%, from about $31  to $28. However,  surplus
estimates have been stable since  1980 (except for the jumps in 1984 and 1985), fluctuating
around $28 per AUM. It would appear that the adoption of the PRIA formula grazing fee in
the  1980  grazing  year  may have  stabilized the  estimated  surplus  associated  with  cattle
grazing on BLM lands. Other factors affecting the demand for federal forage, such as active
preference,  cow inventory,  and  private lease rates,  will shift either the demand or supply
schedules  in  figures 4-7, leading  to  the changes  in welfare  discussed  earlier.  With  little
change  in the estimates of surplus since  1980, it may be possible that the fee is mitigating
demand shifts resulting from factors affecting cow inventories (i.e., the beef price index) or
the price of substitute forage sources (PLLR) to stabilize rancher welfare. Most of the change
in active preference  (figs.  1 and 2) also occured before  1980, thus reducing the possibility
of surplus change resulting from this supply-side source.
There  has been  a much greater  fall in both relative  and absolute  terms in the surplus
associated with the sheep permits. Surplus per sheep AUM has fallen from about $16 to $6,
or a fall of about 63%. As discussed previously, nonfee costs have increased more for sheep
producers  than  for  cattle  producers,  explaining  part  of the  decline  in  surplus  (see  the
discussion of fig.  6). In addition,  there has been significant  downsizing in the U.S. sheep
industry due to increasing labor costs, low lamb prices, and reductions in predator control
(Whipple and Menkhaus).  These changes  would probably appear as  leftward shifts in the
demand for federal  grazing by sheep producers.  The  combination of these two forces has
apparently  had significant effects  on the surplus accruing  to sheep permittees.  Similar to
estimates of surplus for grazing  by cattle,  however,  surplus in the sheep market has been
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stable since  1980.  Most of the changes in active preference appear to have occured prior to
1980, though the aggregation of cattle and sheep preference numbers in 1985 hide changes
in sheep preference the last few years of the study. It appears again that the PRIA grazing
fee may be contributing to stability in sheep permittee welfare  since its adoption in  1980.
Conclusions
Property rights enjoyed by BLM permitees have changed over the last 30 years. Permittees
contend  that these changes  have  increased  transaction  costs,  including  nonfee utilization
costs, and reduced permittee welfare. The results presented in this study confinrm these claims
to a certain extent.  Combined real fee and nonfee costs have  increased about  17% and 29%
for cattle and sheep permittees,  respectively, over the last 31  years. Concurrent with these
cost increases have been reductions in active preference for sheep and, to a lesser extent, for
cattle permits.  Surplus associated with BLM grazing permits  has fallen slightly for cattle
ranchers.  Surplus accruing to sheep producers has fallen substantially,  resulting from both
changes  in active preference for sheep grazing and increases  in utilization costs, as well as
exogenous forces that have shifted the sheep industry's demand for federal forage leftwards.
The analysis  found no evidence of trends in demand that could not be accounted for by
the variables included in the models. Residuals from both the cattle and sheep models were
stationary,  with the probability  of incorrectly rejecting unit roots exceeding  99%  for each
series.  Although there have been changes in the economic property rights associated with
the federal  grazing permit,  the effects were adequately captured by both the observed data
series and  the latent variable  constructed  to reflect nonfee  costs.  Nonstationary  residuals
might have indicated changes in demand resulting from expectations of further attentuations
of the property rights associated with the grazing permits.
A final comment applies about the sensitivity of demand to changes in utilization costs.
Since the PRIA formula was instituted in  1980, grazing fees have been procyclical. When
ranch profitability  improves, the grazing fee  generally  increases. Our results indicate that
the  PRIA  fee  stabilized  permittee  surplus  associated  with  the  grazing  permit.  Perhaps
because  of this success,  fee  alternatives  proposed by various  western livestock producer
associations retain some or all of the PRIA components.  The stabilizing influence may also
be responsible for the observed resistence to changing the basis for the grazing fee. Perhaps
the proposed levels are not such a concern as are the uncertainties associated with subsequent
annual changes.
Because of the procyclical nature of the present formula fee, future changes in the grazing
fee that ignore the timing of introduction may have a greater impact on the demand for AUMs
than indicated by the elasticities  estimated here. Although there currently  is no legislative
mandate to consider ability to pay, the financial impacts of any future changes in either the
grazing  fee or nonfee utilization costs will depend upon conditions in the two  industries at
the time any change is adopted.
[Received August 1994; final version received  April 1995]
7See, for example, the fee alternatives  proposed by the Western Livestock  Producers Alliance and the High Country Citizen's
Alliance contained in  Rangeland  Reform  '94 (USDI/BLM  1993).
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